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Abstract 
 
Recent research in labour economics (e.g. the work of Card and Krueger, 1995, on the impact of 
minimum wages) has led to renewed interest in the appropriate model to use when thinking about the 
labour market.  But, the standard textbook models of both perfect competition and monopsony are both 
implausible, though for different reasons.  The competitive model because it assumes the wage elasticity 
of the supply of labour to the individual firm is infinite and the monopsony model because it assumes that 
an employer cannot do anything to raise employment other than raise the wage.  This paper presents a 
more general but very simple model in which the employer can also raise employment by increasing 
expenditure on recruitment. 
 Using this, it is shown how that division between perfect competition and monopsony is not the 
issue of whether the wage elasticity in labour supply is infinite or finite (as it is usually presented) but 
whether there are diseconomies of scale in recruitment.  Using a unique British data set containing 
information on both labour turnover costs and the number of recruits, we present estimates that do 
suggest that there is an increasing marginal cost of recruitment. 
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Introduction 
 
Recent research in labour economics (e.g. the work of Card and Krueger, 1995, on the impact of 
minimum wages) has led to renewed interest in the appropriate model to use when thinking about the 
labour market.  The textbook model of perfect competition is extreme in that it assumes that a wage cut 
of a cent causes all workers to instantaneously quit to get jobs elsewhere1.  But, many labour 
economists feel uncomfortable with using the main alternative that allows a finite response of labour 
supply to an individual firm to cuts in the wage, a monopsony model (or perhaps, more accurately, a 
model of oligopsonistic competition).  One of the reasons for this unease is that, in the standard 
monopsony model, employers have only one instrument for determining their supply of labour:  the 
wage.  In reality, employers can spend resources on recruitment to influence the flow of recruits to the 
firm. 
 So both the standard perfectly competitive and monopsony models are rather implausible as 
normally stated, the former because it is not credible that the wage elasticity of labour supply to an 
individual firm is infinite and the latter because it is not credible to believe that the only thing an employer 
can do to raise employment is to raise the wage. 
 In this paper we show how an embarrassingly simple model in which the supply of labour to the 
firm can be influenced both by the wage and expenditure on recruitment activity neatly nests both the 
perfectly competitive model and the standard monopsony model.  For this reason, we refer to it as a 
generalised monopsony model.  Using this model we show how the debate between perfect competition 
and monopsony as tools to think about the labour market needs to be shifted away from the issue of the 
whether the wage elasticity of labour supply to the firm (given recruitment activity) is or is not infinite2.  
Instead, the debate should be about whether, for a given wage, there are diseconomies of scale in 
recruitment.  Perfect competition is best thought of as a situation not in which the wage elasticity of the 
labour supply curve facing a firm is infinite for a given level of recruitment activity (which is not really 
credible) but in which the marginal cost of recruiting a worker is independent of the level of employment. 
On the other hand, ‘monopsony’ is shown to correspond to the case where the marginal cost of 
                                                                 
1 There is an issue here about the size of the wage elasticity over different time horizons.  But, taken literally, the 
perfectly competitive model assumes it is infinite over the smallest time horizon. 
2 There is a literature, albeit surprisingly small (one might cite Reynolds, 1946; Nelson, 1973; Sullivan, 1989; Boal, 
1995; Staiger, Spetz and Phibbs, 1999 as an almost complete list), which attempts to test the appropriate model by 
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maintaining given stock of workers is increasing in employment.  This may sound very similar to the usual 
condition for monopsony but the marginal cost of employment being increasing in the wage for a given 
level of recruitment activity is not sufficient for there to be monopsony power. 
 The next section outlines the basic model.  It introduces the concept of the labour cost function 
and derives the condition under which the labour market will be ‘competitive’ or ‘monopsonistic’.  We 
then use data drawn from the UK Institute of Personnel Director’s annual Labour Turnover Survey to 
try to estimate the labour cost function.  We reject the hypothesis that the labour market is competitive 
as we do find evidence of diseconomies in recruitment. 
 
 
1. The Labour Cost Function 
 
Define the labour cost function, which we will denote by C(w,N), as the cost per worker, excluding 
direct wage costs, of keeping employment at N when the firm pays a wage w.  Some examples might 
make the idea clearer.  For example if recruiting and training a worker costs H(w) and the separation 
rate is s(w), a flow of sN recruits is needed to maintain employment at N so that C(w,N)=H(w)s(w).  In 
this case, the labour cost function is independent of N.  But, if it becomes increasingly hard to recruit 
and train workers so that the costs of training and recruitment are H(R,w) where R is the flow of recruits 
then the labour cost function will be of the form C(w,N)=H(s(w)N,w)s(w) in which case it will depend 
on employment.  Below, we show that the dependence or not of C(w,N) on N is of critical importance. 
 The concept of the labour cost function used here is a static one:  in the Appendix we show how a 
simple dynamic model reduces, in steady-state, to the static model when the interest rate is low relative 
to the separation rate3. 
Implicit or explicit labour cost functions can be found in many other papers.  One of the first 
papers to point out the potential importance of turnover costs was Oi (1962) who analysed the 
implications for the responsiveness of the demand for labour to shocks in product demand.  But there 
are many other parts of labour economics where turnover costs play an important role:  the search 
models of Diamond (1982) and Pissarides (1990) (see Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999, for a recent 
                                                                 
estimating the wage elasticity in the supply of labour to the firm.  One should not confuse the paucity of this 
literature with the voluminous literature on the supply of labour to the market as a whole. 
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review), the efficiency wage model of Salop (1979) and the dynamic monopsony model of Mortensen 
(1998) which is based on Burdett and Mortensen (1998). 
One can think of the textbook models of both perfect competition and the static model of 
monopsony as being particular forms (albeit, non-differentiable) of the labour cost function.  The 
perfectly competitive labour market model can be represented in the following way.  If there are no 
recruitment/training costs4 then, if wc is the competitive wage, the labour cost function for the competitive 
model can be represented by: 
 
w<   wif        =  N)C(w,
 
 
w   wif      0  =  N)C(w,
c
c
¥
³
     (1) 
 
This is represented in Figure 1a.  (1) says that any amount of labour can be recruited at zero cost as 
long as the wage paid is at or above the competitive level, but that no labour is available at any cost if a 
wage below the competitive wage is offered. 
The traditional static monopsony model implicitly assumes that a firm that pays a wage w incurs 
no recruitment costs if it wants employment less than the labour supply forthcoming at that wage, Ns(w), 
but that there is no way at all for the firm to attract more workers.  So, the form of the labour cost 
function in this model is: 
 
(w)N>N   if        =  N)C(w,
 
 
 (w)NN   if      0  =  N)C(w,
s
s
¥
£
    (2) 
 
This is represented in Figure 1b. 
Both cases are rather extreme and, in particular they are implausibly non-differentiable.  The 
perfectly competitive model assumes that the tiniest wage cut results in the complete inability to recruit 
                                                                 
3   The Appendix also shows how if the interest rate is large, the labour market is not really competitive even if 
CN=0.
  
4 A simple modification of the formula would allow for this. 
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any workers at all and the monopsony model assumes that there is nothing that an employer can do 
apart from raising the wage to recruit more workers than Ns(w).  The more reasonable case assumes 
differentiability and we stick to this case in what follows. 
Let us now consider the optimal choice of the wage and employment.  If we assume the firm has 
a revenue function F(N), steady-state profits can be written as: 
 
  =  F(N) - [w + C(w,N)]Np      (3) 
 
The firm has a choice of the wage it can pay if it wants to maintain employment at N.  It will 
obviously choose w to minimize direct and indirect labour costs so let us define the function ? (N) as: 
 
N)C(w, +  w  =  (N) wminw       (4) 
 
which, assuming that the labour cost function is differentiable, has the first-order condition: 
 
0  =  N)(w,C - 1- w       (5) 
 
Profits can then be written as: 
 
  =  F(N) - (N)Np w        (6) 
 
(6) should make apparent the relationship between the model presented here and the more familiar 
textbook models of perfect competition and monopsony.  It is that the labour supply curve w(N) needs 
to be replaced by the labour supply curve ? (N).  As ? (N) is the relevant labour supply curve let us call 
it the effective labour supply curve.  We can represent the decision problem for the employer as in 
Figure 2 with w(N) replaced by ? (N), the effective supply of labour to the firm.  Unsurprisingly, it is 
going to be of some interest whether ? (N) is increasing in N which would give us the equivalent of an 
upward-sloping labour supply curve. 
By application of the envelope theorem to (4) we have that: 
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N)(w(N),C  =  (N) Nw ¢       (7) 
 
where w(N) is the wage chosen if employment is N.  This shows that the effective labour supply curve 
facing the firm is upward-sloping if the labour cost function is increasing in employment.  If the labour 
cost function is independent of employment then the effective labour supply curve facing the firm will be 
infinitely elastic and will be like the labour supply curve in a perfectly competitive market.  However it is 
important to note that one can have this result even if the wage elasticity of labour supply to the firm is 
not infinite so that the labour market appears at first sight monopsonistic. 
Now let us consider the employment decision of the firm.  One can write the first-order 
condition for employment as:  
 
'F (N)  =  (N) + (N)Nw w ¢      (8) 
 
The right-hand side of (8) is simply the marginal cost of the effective labour supply curve facing the firm. 
 To bring out the importance of the slope of the w(N) function let us consider the classic issue 
that divides perfect competition and monopsony, the impact of the minimum wage. 
 
 
2. The Impact of a Minimum Wage 
 
In this section, we consider the classic example where the predictions of perfect competition and 
monopsony differ:  the imposition of a binding minimum wage equal to wmin.  In the standard monopsony 
case this makes the labour supply curve facing the firm horizontal wherever it would otherwise pay a 
wage below the minimum.  In the model here, the relevant question is how the minimum wage affects the 
slope of the effective labour supply curve.   
If we are interested in the effect of the minimum wage on employment we need to consider its 
impact on the effective marginal cost of labour.  As in the standard monopsony case, there are two 
effects - see (8).  The minimum wage raises ? (N) but reduces ? =(N).  The total effect on the marginal 
cost of labour can be written as: 
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N),w(C + N),w(C + 1  =  
w
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¶
    (9) 
 
There are some situations in which we can sign this.  Suppose the minimum wage just binds:  then, from 
(5) we must have (1+Cw)=0 and the impact of the minimum wage on employment depends on the sign 
of CwN.  In the >competitive= case where CN=CwN=0 the marginal effect on employment is zero (as the 
wage is chosen to minimize the total labour cost, the minimum wage has a zero first-order effect on 
? (N)):  but any minimum wage above the level chosen by the employer will reduce employment as we 
will then have the case CwN=0 and (1+ Cw)>0 (see Martin, 1997, for a specific application of this 
result). 
However in the ‘non-competitive’ case, (9) shows that, if CwN<0, then a just-binding minimum 
wage reduces the marginal cost of labour and raises employment:  if CwN>0 then the opposite happens.  
Which of these cases is more plausible?  To answer this question, consider the relationship between 
? (N) and the wage paid in the absence of the minimum wage.  By differentiating (5) we will have that: 
 
( )N)(w,C sgn-  =  
N
w
sgn wN÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ
¶
¶
    (10) 
 
(10) shows that  the sign of CwN determines the sign (Mw/MN).  As ? (N) is increasing in employment this 
is equivalent to the issue of whether the wage paid by the employer rises or falls as we move up the 
effective labour supply curve, ? (N).  If CwN<0 then the wage rises and if CwN>0 the wage falls.  One 
can then readily understand the different impacts of the minimum wage in the two cases.  If CwN<0 then 
a minimum wage alters ? (N) in the manner shown by the direction of the arrow in Figure 3a.  The 
marginal cost of labour is lowered by a just-binding minimum wage in this case.  In contrast, if CwN>0 
then a binding minimum wage alters ? (N) in the manner shown by the direction of the arrow in Figure 
3b. 
The case CwN<0 seems more plausible for a number of reasons.  It is consistent with the robust 
empirical finding of a positive employer-size wage effect.  Secondly, it will be guaranteed if C(w,N) is 
multiplicatively separable and CN$0 and Cw<0 so that a higher wage reduces expenditure on training 
and recruitment (e.g. by reducing separation rates). 
Given this discussion, it should be apparent that the form of the labour cost function C(w,N) is 
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of some importance.  The labour market is >monopsonistic= if CN>0 so that the non-wage costs are 
increasing in employment and >competitive= if CN=0.  Although there is a reasonable argument for using 
the labour cost function C(w,N) in all the analysis that follows, and that analysis suggests we should 
focus on the effective labour supply function ? (N) rather than the labour supply function w(N), this is 
hard to do as we rarely have the requisite data on non-wage labour costs like training and recruitment 
costs.  However, the next section uses data on recruitment and training costs from a British survey to 
attempt to estimate the labour cost function. 
 
 
3. The Data 
 
The data used in this paper comes from the Labour Turnover Survey conducted by the UK Institute for 
Personnel Development every year from 1997 to 1999.  These surveys were the latest in a series of 
postal surveys of personnel professionals in the private and public sectors:  in the 3 years there are a 
total of 2016 responding firms.  The survey asks questions about the number of staff that have left and 
been recruited over the previous year for 10 broad occupational groups, on recruitment difficulties, 
redundancy and, importantly from our point of view, the costs of labour turnover.  This makes the data 
set rather unusual and justifies its use here (since Oi’s pioneering 1962 study which uses data from 1951 
there have been hardly any papers written on the size of turnover costs).  But, unfortunately, information 
on the level of pay is missing and there is only very rudimentary information on establishment 
characteristics.  We discuss how to deal with the lack of wage information below. 
Table 1a compares the sectoral distribution of the respondents with the distribution of 
employment from the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS).  The most striking deviation from the population 
distribution is the larger fraction of employment in the IPD sample from the public sector.  This is 
because the public sector is over-represented in IPD membership because of the greater 
professionalisation of the personnel function there.  Table 1b compares the occupational distribution of 
employment in the IPD compared to the LFS:  there are fewer discrepancies here.  However, one other 
important way in which the establishments in our sample differ from the population is their size.  All of 
the IPD respondents refer to groups with more than 100 workers, while 50% of individuals are in 
workplaces that are smaller than this. 
Table 2 presents some information on the size of turnover costs.  The data on turnover costs in 
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this data set comes from a question that asks: 
 
Aif possible please indicate by ticking the relevant box the estimated cost of turnover 
(e.g. recruitment and training costs) per individual employee for each of the following 
occupational groups within your organisation@ 
The replies were banded and the answers by occupation are given in the top rows of Table 2 and the 
final line gives the average using the mid-point of each band as the average within bands and 15000 for 
the top band (different methods of computing the average turnover cost do not make much difference).  
As can be seen, turnover costs are highest at about £4800 for managerial and professional staff and 
lowest for unskilled workers and operatives where £1000 is a more reasonable estimate.  We need to 
multiply this by the labour turnover rate to get the per-period cost.  The average labour turnover rates 
per year are reported in the next row, and, converted to a weekly rate, are multiplied by the average 
turnover cost in the following row.  One can see that the gap in the turnover costs between higher-
skilled and lower-skilled workers is now much smaller as turnover rates are higher for less-skilled 
workers.  To get some idea of the importance of turnover costs, we need to relate this to the average 
weekly wage.  The IPD data does not have information on wages so we have simply taken average 
earnings for each of the occupations from the Labour Force Survey (LFS).  The next row shows these 
average weekly earnings and the final row then computes the turnover cost as a percentage of earnings. 
 Turnover costs are highest in percentage terms for sales workers at over 10% of wage costs but the 
next highest group is clerical workers at 4.8%.  There no longer seems to be any particular relationship 
between turnover costs and skill levels so turnover costs would seem to be as important at the bottom 
end of the skills distribution as at the top.  35 years ago, Oi estimated turnover costs in one company 
(International Harvester) in one year (1951) at 7.3% of labour costs for all employees but 4.1% for 
common labourers.  We have few more recent estimates:  Campbell (1993) has an implicit average 
estimate of about 8% (though he does not explicitly report this statistic).  The overall level of turnover 
costs here are similar. 
Attention in this section has focused on the level of turnover costs.  But, as the previous section 
showed, it may not be the level of turnover costs but how they change with the wage and level of 
recruitment activity that is important for answering questions about how labour markets work. 
 
 
9  
4. Estimating the Labour Cost Function 
 
In this section we present some estimates of the labour cost function using the Labour Turnover Survey 
data.  As will be shown, we cannot, with the data available estimate all of the function but we can test 
the hypothesis of whether the marginal cost of a recruit is increasing in the level of recruits. 
Suppose that the cost of a given level of recruits can be written as the following iso-elastic 
function of the wage, recruitment and employment: 
 
0 1ln , ln ln ln C(w,R N)    c - (w) + (R) (N)a b bº -     (11) 
 
Both the level of recruitment and employment are included to allow for the possibility (amongst others) 
that it is the ratio of recruitment to employment that determines the costs of recruitment.  We would like 
to be able to estimate this function but, unfortunately, the IPD data has no data on wages.  However, we 
can still obtain some insight into the marginal costs of recruitment.  Assume that the separation rate can 
be written as ln(s)=s-?ln(w).  Then, as sN=R, the labour cost function can be written as the following 
function of w and N:   
 
0 0 0 1ln ln ( )ln C(w,N)    c+ s - ( + ) (w) + (N)b a b g b bº -    (12) 
 
so that it is 0 1b b bº -  that determines whether there diseconomies of scale in recruitment.  The wage 
will be chosen to satisfy (5) which can be written as: 
 
0 0
0
ln ln
ln
(c+ s)+ ( + )+ (N)
(w)  =  
1+ +
b a b g b
a b g
   (13) 
 
which, substituting into (0.12) leads to: 
 
0
0 0
0 0
ln ln ln
1
 C    [c s+ (N)] - ( + )
1+ 1+
a gb
b b a gb
a gb a gb
+
º +
+ +
  (14) 
 
(14) expresses the labour cost function in terms of N alone.  Note, that the coefficient on N is not the ß 
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in which we are interested but ß/(1+a+gb0) so the coefficient is biased towards zero.  But one can still 
look to see whether there is evidence that ß>05. 
 In estimating (14) there is an endogeneity problem associated with the fact that unobserved 
differences in turnover costs that are in the error in our equation are likely to be negatively correlated 
with the level of recruits.  It is not clear that much can be done about this except to notice that this will 
tend to bias our coefficients towards zero so that a finding that b>0 remains convincing evidence against 
the hypothesis that b=0. 
Table 3 presents some estimates of the labour cost function of (14) using the IPD data.  In the 
first row, all the observations are pooled together and job, sector and year controls are included and an 
interval regression is estimated.  The coefficient on the log of employment is 0.050 and is significantly 
different from zero.  This is evidence that ß>0 and the labour cost function is increasing in employment.  
The next row estimates the model by OLS using mid-points of the turnover cost bands as measures of 
the turnover costs:  this makes little difference to the estimated coefficient.  The third row estimates a 
more demanding model where individual firm dummies are included.  The coefficient drops (as we might 
expect from the likely increase in the importance of measurement error) but still remains significantly 
different from zero so that recruitment costs are significantly higher within a firm, in occupations where 
there is a high level of employment. 
The rest of the table investigates the robustness of the estimates by  estimating the same 
specification for the private and public sector.  As can be seen, the results are robust.  One might also 
wonder about whether there are significant differences by occupation.  Table 4 examines this by 
estimating separate models for each occupation for all sectors and for the public and private sectors 
separately.  All but two of the estimated employment elasticities are positive and none of the negative 
ones are significantly different from zero.  There is some evidence that diseconomies of scale in 
recruitment are weaker for unskilled manual workers. 
 These results are supportive of the view that the supply of recruits to the firm is not perfectly 
elastic at a given level of costs and, hence that the labour market is monopsonistic.  Given the likely 
downward biases in the estimates, the true extent of diseconomies in recruitment is likely to be greater 
than found here. 
                                                                 
5   The Appendix also shows how if the interest rate is large, the labour market is not really competitive even if 
CN=0.
  
5 A simple modification of the formula would allow for this. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
This paper has presented a simple model of the labour market that nests both the textbook competitive 
and monopsony models in a more general framework.  It has shown how the key issue for whether 
labour markets are best thought of as ‘competitive’ or ‘monopsonistic’ is whether there are 
diseconomies of scale in recruitment.  Using British data we have presented some evidence of such 
diseconomies which implies that the total cost of labour to a firm is increasing in the level of employment 
and, hence, it is best to think of the labour market as monopsonistic.
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Table 1a 
The Representativeness of the IPD Labour Turnover Survey Dataset:  Industry 
 
Percentage of Employment IPD LFS 
 Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and 
Fishing 
0.10 1.76 
 Mining and Extraction 0.30 0.39 
 Manufacturing 10.04 18.31 
 Electricity, Gas and Water 1.18 0.69 
 Construction 0.97 6.99 
 Wholesale and Retail Trade 11.10 15.66 
 Hotels, Restaurants and Leisure 0.88 4.50 
 Transport, Storage and 
Communication 
4.38 6.55 
 Health and Social Work 14.52 11.41 
 Education 3.43 7.88 
 Finance, Insurance and Real Estate, 
and Business Services 
19.53 14.52 
 Government 31.36 6.03 
 Other Community Services 2.21 5.30 
 
Notes: 
1. The IPD data is employment-weighted for comparability with the LFS.  The LFS data comes from the LFS 
from March 1997 to February 2000. 
 
Table 1b 
The Representativeness of the IPD Labour Turnover Survey Dataset:  Occupation 
 
Percentage of Employment IPD LFS 
Managers and Administrators 12.5 16.0 
Professional 14.2 10.5 
Associate Professional, Technical 
and Scientific 
11.9 10.0 
Clerical and Secretarial 16.7 15.3 
Sales 6.8 8.2 
Personal and Protective Services 6.7 10.9 
Craft and Skilled Manual 8.2 11.9 
Plant and Machine Operatives 17.1 9.3 
Other 6.0 7.8 
 
Notes: 
1. The IPD data is employment-weighted.  The LFS data comes from the LFS from March 1997 to February 
2000. 
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Table 2 
The Size of Turnover Costs 
 
 
 
 
 
manager-ial 
 
profess-
ional 
 
technical 
 
clerical 
 
sales 
 
personal 
 
Craft and 
Skilled 
 
operatives 
 
unskilled 
 
<,750 
 
6.0 
 
3.7 
 
6.0 
 
23.9 
 
15.3 
 
31.7 
 
35.5 
 
63.1 
 
44.8 
 
,750-,1500 
 
11.0 
 
8.7 
 
15.9 
 
33.6 
 
15.8 
 
33.6 
 
32.2 
 
24.5 
 
19.1 
 
,1500-
,3000 
 
22.7 
 
24.2 
 
32.6 
 
29.8 
 
26.8 
 
20.8 
 
22.6 
 
9.3 
 
22.4 
 
,3000-
,5000 
 
27.8 
 
28.6 
 
22.7 
 
8.8 
 
19.1 
 
9.1 
 
6.5 
 
1.6 
 
7.7 
 
,5000-
,7500 
 
15.1 
 
17.9 
 
13.3 
 
2.6 
 
12.4 
 
1.5 
 
1.9 
 
0.4 
 
3.3 
 
,7500-
,10000 
 
9.2 
 
9.7 
 
5.7 
 
1.0 
 
6.3 
 
2.2 
 
0.7 
 
0.5 
 
1.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
turnover 
cost 
(£) 
 
>,10000 
 
8.2 
 
7.0 
 
3.7 
 
0.3 
 
4.3 
 
1.1 
 
0.5 
 
0.5 
 
1.7 
 
average turnover cost (,) 
 
4749 
 
4823 
 
3736 
 
1783 
 
3574 
 
1777 
 
1528 
 
1170 
 
937 
 
turnover rate (% per year) 
 
15.6 
 
23.4 
 
19.0 
 
26.2 
 
26.6 
 
28.4 
 
23.7 
 
28.3 
 
34.2 
 
turnover rate * turnover 
cost (, per week) 
 
15.2 
 
20.6 
 
14.1 
 
10.1 
 
17.7 
 
7.4 
 
7.5 
 
6.5 
 
6.3 
 
average weekly earnings 
 
482 
 
449 
 
353 
 
208 
 
158 
 
169 
 
294 
 
262 
 
turnover cost as fraction 
of total cost 
 
3.1 
 
4.6 
 
4.0 
 
4.8 
 
11.2 
 
4.4 
 
2.6 
 
2.4 
 
2.4 
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Table 3 
The Costs of Recruitment 
 
Sample 
Estimation 
Method 
Coefficient 
on 
Ln(Employm
ent) 
Firm 
Controls 
Sector 
Controls 
Job 
Controls 
Number 
of Obs 
 
R2 
All 
Interval 
Regression 
0.060 
(0.008) 
No Yes Yes 4761  
All OLS 
0.059 
(0.009) 
No Yes Yes 4761 
 
0.40 
All OLS 
0.023 
(0.008) 
Yes No Yes 4819 0.61 
Private 
Sector 
Interval 
Regression 
0.064 
(0.010) 
No Yes Yes 3508  
Private 
sector 
OLS 
0.063 
(0.010) 
No Yes Yes 3508 0.41 
Private 
Sector 
OLS 
0.033 
(0.012) 
Yes No Yes 3508 0.65 
Public 
Sector 
Interval 
Regression 
0.064 
(0.015) 
No Yes Yes 1253  
Public 
Sector 
OLS 
0.064 
(0.015) 
No Yes Yes 1253 0.37 
Public 
Sector 
OLS 
0.035 
(0.017) 
Yes No Yes 1253 0.74 
 
Notes: 
1. All standard errors are hetero-scedastic consistent.
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Table 4 
 
The Costs of Recruitment:  Differences by Occupation 
 
 All Private sector Public Sector 
sample 
Coefficient 
(S.e.) 
Number of 
obs 
Coefficient 
(S.e.) 
Number of 
obs 
Coefficient 
(S.e.) 
Number 
of obs 
managerial 
0.067 
(0.024) 
907 
0.080 
(0.027) 
646 
0.031 
(0.045) 
261 
professional 
0.109 
(0.020) 
618 
0.118 
(0.024) 
413 
0.091 
(0.037) 
205 
technical 
0.094 
(0.023) 
561 
0.119 
(0.028) 
393 
0.044 
(0.039) 
168 
clerical 
0.108 
(0.020) 
859 
0.114 
(0.027) 
615 
0.090 
(0.040) 
244 
Sales 
0.061 
(0.032) 
443 
0.048 
(0.032) 
409 
0.291 
(0.161) 
34 
personal 
0.105 
(0.053) 
155 
0.129 
(0.076) 
74 
0.068 
(0.077) 
81 
Craft/skilled 
0.064 
(0.029) 
450 
0.040 
(0.036) 
349 
0.133 
(0.043) 
101 
operatives 
0.019 
(0.036) 
358 
0.016 
(0.038) 
331 
-0.023 
(0.101) 
27 
unskilled 
0.020 
(0.021) 
410 
-0.007 
(0.026) 
278 
0.078 
(0.035) 
132 
 
 
Notes: 
1. The dependent variable is for the log of the recruitment cost per worker. 
2. Sector dummies, job dummies (where appropriate) and year dummies are included.  
Regressions are weighted using the level of employment. 
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Figure 1a 
The Labour Cost Function:  Perfect Competition 
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Figure 1b 
The Labour Cost Function:  Monopsony 
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Figure 2 
The Effective Labour Supply Curve of the Firm 
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Figure 3a 
The Effect of a Minimum Wage on the Effective Labour Supply Curve:  CwN<0 
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Figure 3b 
The Effect of a Minimum Wage on the Effective Labour Supply Curve:  CwN>0 
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Appendix 
A Dynamic Version of the Model 
 
Suppose that the per-recruit cost of hiring and training R recruits if the wage paid is w can be written as 
H(R,w).  Assume that the separation rate is a function s(w) of the wage. 
Define a value function P(N) to be the discounted value of profits if the employer has 
employment equal to N.  Then we will have: 
 
{ ( ), ( )}( ( )) max ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ( ), ( )) ( ) '( ( )) '( )R t w tr N t F N t w t N t H R t w t R t N t N tP = - - + P  (15) 
 
subject to the constraint: 
 
'( ) ( ) ( ( ) ) ( )N t R t s w t N t= -       (16) 
 
Substituting (16) into (15) gives us: 
 
( ){ ( ), ( )}( ( )) max ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ( ), ( )) ( ) '( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( )R t w tr N t F N t w t N t H R t w t R t N t R t s w t N tP = - - + P -
(17) 
 
The first-order condition for R(t) in this problem can be written as: 
 
' 0RH RH- - + P =       (18) 
 
and the first-order condition for w(t) as: 
 
'. ' 0wN H R s N- - - P =      (19) 
 
Additionally, there is the envelope condition that can be written as: 
 
' ' ' ''( )r F w s R sNP = - - P + P -     (20) 
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In a steady-state, we will have R=sN so that (20) can be written as: 
( ) ' 'r s F w+ P = -      (21) 
 
which simply says that the marginal value of an extra worker is the gap between the marginal 
product and the wage divided by (r+s). 
Substituting (21) into (18) leads to: 
 
'
R
F w
H RH
r s
-
= +
+
      (22) 
 
 
and, using (18) to eliminate P’ from (19) leads to: 
 
( ). ' 0w RN H R H RH s N- - - + =      (23) 
 
Now, define the labour cost function to be C(N,w)=H(s(w)N,w)s(w).  Using the fact that, in steady-
state, R=sN, the first-order conditions (22) and (23) can be written as: 
 
[ ]( )'
( ) N
r s w
F w C NC
s w
+
- = +       (24) 
 
and: 
 
1 0wC- - =       (25) 
 
If r=0, then these reduce to the first-order conditions from the static problem in the paper from the 
maximization of (3) with respect to N and (5). 
 If r>0, things are not identical.  But, they are more favourable to the monopsony case.  To see 
this, consider the example where CN=0 so that we can write C(N,w) as s(w)H(w).  The first-order 
condition for employment can then be written as F’(N)=w+[r+s(w)]H(w), where the right-hand side is 
the effective cost of labour.  But, the wage is chosen to minimize [w+s(w)H(w)].  So, when a just-
binding minimum wage is imposed, the effective cost of labour must fall and employment must rise. 
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